Chapter 115 Countdown (3)
Chapter 115 Countdown (3)
an army of 3.4 million.
if someone asks whether we can't just push to berlin or vienna now that the enemy is distracted by other fronts.
'we're not germany. we can't bet everything on one shot.'
nikolai ivanov, appointed commander of the dual monarchy's poland front, couldn't agree.
there are reasons the general staff is taking long-term war as fact.
first, the moment current russian forces advance into enemy territory, they must temporarily abandon rail supply.
not only will the enemy obviously destroy railways while retreating, but above all, the rail gauge specifications used by the russian empire differ from those used by germany and the austro-hungarian empire.
meaning they can't use even the three existing poland-germany railways until completely modifying them.
second is the point that massive numbers of troops can't be packed into one front.
despite having superior forces to the enemy, from the russian army's perspective it was difficult to advance mindlessly expanding along the massive front stretching from the north sea to the romanian border.
considering supply routes, it was fair to say advance locations were essentially predetermined.
finally.
"hötzendorf, that damned fellow."
the enemy is determined to widen the front.
the austro-hungarian empire and germany aren't fools.
their armies aren't being pushed back because they're weaker and stupider than russian forces, but because they've entered endurance mode while temporarily focusing strength elsewhere.
and conrad von hötzendorf, who emerged as the austro-hungarian empire's commander-in-chief, knew this fact too well.
he acknowledged russian forces' numbers and was slowly spreading the front in pure defensive posture.
the dual monarchy's 150-mile, about 280km border.
not trying to win.
trying to endure.
'even if they break through, they'll eventually be blocked like moths caught in spider webs slowing down.'
hötzendorf is waiting now.
for the day german forces butchering belgium reach the east.
for that moment when the eastern front switches from defense to attack.
'if those german forces return when we've dug in deep... the damage can't be estimated.'
recalling his experience leading the first manchurian army during the russo-japanese war, ivanov didn't want to be easily drawn into hötzendorf's delaying tactics.
however, as it becomes long-term war, maintaining this massive front will consume tremendous national power, and the eastern front might become this war's core rather than the western front.
'original history's germany didn't lose territory. if commander-in-chief brusilov smoothly occupies poland like this, it wouldn't be strange for enemy main force to flood east.'
even i would desperately defend if the enemy approached moscow or st. petersburg, would berlin be different?
if things flow like this, before western europe's destruction, a 'russia first' scenario might unfold.
'though trench warfare would add some defensive advantage... that's not enough.'
though i tried finding solutions for quite a while, well, no proper answer appears.
the only consolation is recalling how the eastern front entered slight lull after original history's brusilov offensive.
however, making my deepening concerns meaningless, chief of staff kuropatkin presented an answer.
"can't we just pressure britain and france? with fronts split east and west, it's not an issue of main attack and supporting attack."
"then, what's the issue?"
"your majesty, this is simple politics."
kuropatkin stubbornly maintained a perspective that stood in stark opposition to my own analysis throughout our discussions, presenting his views with an air of unquestioned certainty and dismissing any alternative interpretations.
while i endeavored to conduct a thorough examination of both the tactical and strategic dimensions of the enemy's capabilities following their successful occupation of poland - including their deployment patterns, logistical networks, and battlefield adaptations - kuropatkin categorically dismissed these military considerations. he insisted on framing the entire situation as merely a political issue, refusing to engage with the operational realities on the ground or acknowledge the military implications of the occupation.
"though your majesty never directly said so, surely you want to watch the western front intensify from poland?"
"if i must express it, yes."
"then it's simple. first eat poland, then use this to pressure the allies."
"..."
not pressuring the enemy's two fronts but pressuring our allies.
'...is this person truly a soldier?'
though i momentarily wondered if such a vile person should be general staff head, kuropatkin was proud without a hint of shame.
no, he even seemed pleased.
"there are no eternal alliances in international society. and if by chance germany and the dual monarchy truly use full power, abandoning serbia and france to attack us..."
"if they do?"
"we must make peace negotiations with germany."
though they say desk soldiers are all half-steeped in politics no different from duma deputies, can someone change this much without tasting the field?
"peace..."
yet amusingly, i could find no errors in kuropatkin's words.
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